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In the great scheme of things, how important are the prob-
lems with law reviews? Jim Lindgren's essay is a bit overheated,
even for someone enamored of polemic as a literary form.' But
he does have a point: if law reviews are going to be published,
the task should be done better than it is. That does not mean
getting rid of student law reviews. Not even for Jim2-but it does
require patience and further inquiry into the nature of legal
scholarship.
I join in several of Jim Lindgren's suggestions. Most impor-
tant, authors' names and affiliations should be physically re-
moved from articles before selection begins, as at least a partial
prophylactic against good articles being ignored.3 In addition,
t Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. Copyright * 1994 by Wendy J.
Gordon. I began preparing this essay while I was Lecturer in Law at Yale Law School. I
am indebted for discussion of this topic to many colleagues at both BU and Yale, as well
as to Sam Postbrief, the editors of this Review, and the participants in the January 1994
AALS meeting convened to consider forming a new section on law reviews and legal
scholarship. I should also note that I have a longstanding friendship with my antagonist
here, Jim Lindgren, who has on occasion made excellent suggestions about my writ-
ing-for example, it was he who told me about Joseph Williams's useful book Style: Ten
Lessons in Clarity and Grace (Chicago, 3d ed 1989)-and who has often provided both a
willing ear and advice when law review editors were getting me down. Also, as I myself
have never been guilty of any of the editorial sins that swarm through Jim's pages-
having never myself been among a law review's editors-I feel free to defend the latter
with gusto.
' See James Lindgren, Return to Sender, 78 Cal L Rev 1719, 1719 (1990) ("Polemics
have a long and honorable history. ").
2 Jim's suggestions for improvement do not include elimination of the student-run
law review. See James Lindgren, An Author's Manifesto, 61 U Chi L Rev 527, 535 (1994)
("Manifesto").
You may be wondering, why "Jim" rather than the expected "Professor Lindgren?
Law review criticism may be one of the few places where law review editors are willing to
bend their usual rules, and here it's the customs of formality and distance that are giving
way a little.
' Conceivably a professor's school affiliation and prior scholarly output can provide a
useful aid to student editors buried under piles of manuscripts. This is conceded by Jor-
dan H. Leibman and James P. White, How the Student-Edited Law Journals Make Their
Publication Decisions, 39 J Legal Educ 387 (1989), who nonetheless favor initial blind
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student editors should read several style books 4 and be other-
wise better trained before daring to correct others' prose. Fur-
ther, faculty input into the publishing process should be in-
creased,5 and more faculty-edited journals should enter the field.
Also, more empirical research into the review process should be
undertaken.6 But it seems to me that from what we know now,
the virtues of the student-edited review outweigh its vices, from
the perspective of all those it affects.
My essay will have two parts. The first will be a response to
Jim Lindgren. The second will be a defense of one much-ma-
ligned aspect of student-run law reviews, their obsession with
having authors provide background information and footnotes.
I. A RESPONSE TO LINDGREN
A. Beneficiaries or Victims?
A wide range of persons and institutions are potentially
affected by law reviews. These include students, individual pro-
fessors, the professoriat's pretensions to (or achievement of) meri-
reads to counter in-school favoritism and other undue influences. (Their article is one of
the best addressing the question of law review restructuring.) AsL Leibman and White
note, such procedures should be combined with methods to reduce the flood of manu-
scripts. See id at 418-20. See also Erik M. Jensen, The Law Review Manuscript Glut: The
Need for Guidelines, 39 J Legal Educ 383 (1989). They should also be supplemented with
methods to better select, educate, and coordinate the law review members who make
article selections. See Leibman and White, 39 J Legal Edue at 420-22.
' I recommend Joseph Williams, Style: Ten Lessons in Clarity and Grace
(HarperCollins, 4th ed 1994) and Robert Graves and Alan Hodge, The Reader Over Your
Shoulder (Random House, 1979). The Texas Law Review Manual on Style (Texas Law
Review Assoc, 7th ed 1992) is not suitable for providing such a general education, as two
editors of the Texas Law Review themselves implicitly admit. See Charles D. Moody and
Arthur S. Feldman, Greetings from Hell, 78 Cal L Rev 1703, 1704-08, 1716 (1990).
' For one interesting suggestion on how this might be done, see Leibman and White,
39 J Legal Educ at 423-24. They suggest that the AALS organize willing faculty into a
number of national panels, each with substantive expertise in a particular area and
willing to review a certain number of manuscripts per year. Authors who wished to use
the panels' services would be free to append the panels' evaluations and recommendations
to their manuscripts when sending them to student reviews. "Ultimately, those reviews
should prove to be influential, but probably not dispositive .... Like judges, the student-
editors would still have the final say, but now they would have the help of expert witness-
es." Id at 424.
Leibman and White defer discussion of the details. How such a program would be
administered, what kind of incentives would draw expert faculty to serve as reviewers,
and similar questions, are issues that need to be hammered out. But the Leibman and
White article is aimed more at putting the issue on the professorial agenda rather than at
answering all questions.
6 But note that my emphasis on which questions most need investigation is some-
what different from his. See text accompanying notes 8-9.
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tocracy, the bar and practicing judges, and society as a whole.
Are they more likely beneficiaries, or victims?
1. Students.
Opinion is divided as to how much students gain from the
current system. At many schools, students who do not make the
review feel alienated, while students who achieve editorships
often fail to attend classes. And after the first couple of spading
assignments, the time spent on checking footnotes probably
yields little marginal benefit to the student laborer. Further,
some observers feel strongly that the students' learning/time
ratio could be drastically improved if students turned the time
spent on editing the articles of others toward writing additional
papers of their own.
On the other hand, most student editors consider their re-
view work a valuable learning experience.7 Admittedly, cognitive
dissonance may be partially responsible for their view. (Those
who feel themselves required to jump through resume-enhancing
hoops are more likely than outsiders to assign a transcendent
value to hoop-hopping.) Nevertheless, student perception that
being on law review provides valuable learning experience strikes
me as accurate.
Membership on a law review is one of the few forms of ap-
prenticeship left in our profession. (Clinic participation is anoth-
er.) These activities put students into unusually close contact
with expert professionals, and in a context where the latter really
care not only about the process (in which, as teachers, they may
try to show tolerance and flexibility) but also about the outcome.
Such benefits should not lightly be foregone. Working with au-
thor/lawyers, students often learn not only subtleties of legal
thinking that might not be available outside such one-on-one
contact,8 but they may also learn what they should have known
earlier-that details count and that sloppiness is intolerable.
If the outcome is sometimes an excessive concern with form
and detail-how does the footnote look?-surely the alternative is
worse. And over time, as these students on reviews go out into
' Max Stier, et al, Law Review Usage and Suggestions for Improvement: A Survey of
Attorneys, Professors, and Judges, 44 Stan L Rev 1467, 1491-92 (1992). By no means are
all students happy with the experience, however. See, for example, an article by a former
student editor, E. Joshua Rosenkranz, Law Review's Empire, 39 Hastings L J 859 (1988)
(by implication).
' Such contact is also available in seminar papers.
1994]
The University of Chicago Law Review
practice, the obsessions will moderate and leave behind a healthy
respect for precision.
At least that is my current estimate and hope. My discussion
necessarily rests on many assumptions for which evidence is
scarce. I therefore echo one of Jim's recommendations, that more
empirical research be done and made accessible, on a variety of
law-review related pedagogic questions.
For example: How would overall student morale, class atten-
dance, and productivity change if students ceased editing the law
reviews? How many student editors do indeed feel the process
valuable, and for what purposes? If student note-writing and
editing were eliminated, how many additional opportunities to
write papers (in close consultation with professors) would be
available to the released students? Do the law reviews enroll only
an elite who already know the value of precision? How many
students on the law reviews deal in depth with author/lawyers,
and what percentage of students in law school join reviews?
Some of this data is available in scattered form at individual
law schools; some is collected;9 much is not; and, so far as I
know, no overall compendium of the existing data exists. Until I
have better answers to these and similar questions, my best
estimate is that, from the perspective of furthering student learn-
ing, student-run reviews provide a net benefit to students.
2. Individual professors, as authors and consumers.
In our capacity as authors, student editors drive us crazy. I
actually suspect that the stress caused by their overshort dead-
lines ("respond to our edit in three days or we'll print it OUR
way") has caused health problems. The line-editing of prose is, as
Jim indicates, usually maddening and time-consuming, and often
more destructive than helpful.
But as Jim fails to indicate, the student editors sometimes
recommend tremendously helpful structural changes. On one
occasion I had reworked a lengthy article through more than five
drafts over eight years: the first time I presented it to a faculty
colloquium was in 1985, and by 1993 the article was a verbal
thicket. Only the constant admonition of my student editor-to
simplify, simplify, simplify-finally made the article's argument
linear and satisfactory." Indeed, nearly every one of my articles
9 See, for example, Leibman and White, 39 J Legal Educ 387 (cited in note 3); Stier,
et al, 44 Stan L Rev 1467 (cited in note 7); and the sources collected in Manifesto at 532.
10 Note, however, that I did the simplifying myself. I do not know if I would have
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has been stronger coming out of the editorial process than it was
going in.
In our capacity as consumers of scholarly articles, it is cus-
tomary to complain that law reviews contain nothing but deaden-
ing prose and overstuffed style." Admittedly, the literature con-
tains many rambling pieces that could do with a top-notch edit
and shrink treatment, and funny articles (like those by Pierre
Schlag or-gasp-Jim Lindgren) are all too few. But in reading
many law review articles, I actually enjoy myself. I even like
footnotes. 2 Because they provide an author the opportunity to
conduct a sort of running dialogue with herself, footnotes some-
times give me the feeling that I am looking through a window
into someone's head as she composes.
3. The meritocracy.
Jim's Essay shows a concern that a scholar's affiliation with
an elite school might prejudice the process by which articles are
selected. However, neither his publishing record nor mine sug-
gests that only teachers at Ivy League schools are able to place
articles well. Still, many researchers have reported that bias
exists, particularly reflecting some student temptation to favor
their own (in-house) professors." Therefore blind reviewing (de-
leting the name and other identifying data from each article
submitted), which is common in other disciplines, should become
the rule in law reviews as well, at least at the initial stages of
article selection.
There is an aristocracy in the law school world which can
lead to undervaluing the work of outsiders; this should be resist-
ed to the extent possible. In addition to blind review, another
mode of resisting the aristocratic tendency is to insist on full
recognition of prior scholarship on a given topic. As discussed
below, the law reviews already engage in this practice. Further,
it may be that the students are less dominated by "methodologi-
cal and intellectual orthodoxies" 4 than peer review journals in
been as pleased if the editor had made the changes.
" The classic here is Fred Rodell's exuberantly curmudgeonly piece in the Virginia
Law Review, reprinted and supplemented in his Goodbye to Law Reviews-Revisited, 48
Va L Rev 279 (1962).
12 Honest.
" See, for example, Leibman and White, 39 J Legal Educ at 405-06 (cited in note 3).
14 K.R. St.Onge, The Melancholy Anatomy of Plagiarism 29-30 (University Press,
1988). Lindgren also notices this. See Manifesto at 534-35.
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some disciplines sometimes seem to be. This too may work to
open the journals to new voices.
4. Judges and the bar.
Fred Rodell argued that lazy lawyers use law review articles
to collect cases and arguments. He saw something wrong with
that. 5 I am at a loss to understand what he had against the
practice, other than his disapproval of lazy lawyers whose self-
interest might lead them to support modes of legal scholarship
which Rodell disdained. But if law reviews can make even lazy
lawyers better lawyers, two cheers. And if as a result judges are
better informed, three cheers.
It has also been argued that taking the law reviews away
from students would make the reviews so theoretical that law-
yers and judges would stop reading them. I think that is a possi-
bility.
5. Society at large.
As Rodell saw, perhaps the most important problem with law
review articles is the ivory-towerism of professors-the likelihood
that the professoriat will talk primarily to itself, caught in legal-
isms and ignoring the real world. 5 But we have made progress
since Rodell first wrote. The Legal Realist movement and its
progeny-movements such as Law and Economics, Critical Legal
Studies, and Law and Society-have forced us to expand our
frame of reference beyond the four corners of cases.
Insularity is, of course, something we still need to fight.
These movements have introduced their own islands of discourse.
CLS writing tends to be in a language best understood by CLS
initiates; Law & Economics articles tend to speak most clearly to
Law & Economics folk; and so on. Removing students from their
editorships, so that we talk only to each other prior to publica-
tion, is hardly likely to ameliorate this problem.
B. Specific Responses
My primary disagreement with Jim Lindgren's article is one
of emphasis. On the whole I like rather than dislike the system
of student-run law reviews. As mentioned above, however, the
"' Rodell, 48 Va L Rev at 285-86, 287 (cited in note 11).
'6 See id at 283-84.
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institution could be improved, and many of Jim's suggestions are
good ones. One suggestion, however, is not. Jim calls for more
specialization in journals.17 To the contrary, I think that what
the professoriat has to offer is the ability to cross subject-matter
and doctrinal lines, and to utilize the interrelationships that exist
in the real world. A drastic increase in the number of specialized
journals might work against this possibility.
As for the empirical details of Jim's article, most are unex-
ceptionable. A few are otherwise. The data he cites on student
interviewers have no necessary relevance to the topic at hand, 8
and his pointing to faculty teaching areas as an indicator of re-
search interests seems of dubious value, particularly given the
mandatory concentration of teachers in the first-year curricu-
lum.9 But these are minor cavils. It is good that Jim is working
to put our scholarly institutions on the professional agenda.
II. ON PRAISING PREDECESSORS
A. Footnotes and Literature Reviews
Perhaps the most common criticism of law reviews (other
than those Jim makes) is the complaint that the students are too
obsessed with "prior art." This obsession shows itself in two
ways. First, most articles are expected to contain a lengthy intro-
ductory section where the author summarizes the relevant case
law and literature from which her topic has arisen. Second, most
articles are expected to contain a great many footnotes.
As for the inclusion of introductory background sections,
many professors feel these sections do little more than cater to
law review editors' ignorance, at fairly high cost. These costs
include: increasing the time needed to write an article and thus
decreasing the number of contributions to the literature one can
make; increasing the time needed to read an article and thus
decreasing readership or unnecessarily sapping valuable eye
time; increasing an article's length and thus reducing the number
and diversity of articles that can be published; increasing the
boredom level of the law review literature; and increasing the
"7 Manifesto at 536. Leibman and White make a similar suggestion, citing additional
reasons, 39 J Legal Educ at 421-22 (cited in note 3).
'8 See Manifesto at 537.
, Id at 532 (noting a discrepancy between journal subject matter and subjects most
frequently taught). It is unclear how this pattern disserves faculty interests; even if most
journals do not publish many articles in often-taught subjects, faculty writing and
teaching interests are frequently not the same.
1994]
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chance that the author's central ideas will be lost amid discus-
sion of ancillary matters. The complaints about footnote costs are
parallel.
It is clear that both literature reviews and footnotes can be
overdone. But on balance, I think it a good thing that most of our
journals require both.20 First, placing the article in context helps
the student editors select more wisely. (Hopefully they will do a
preemption check before accepting a piece, which should also
assist them in making an educated choice.) Second, placing the
article in context-even though the students may not fully recog-
nize when this is well or poorly done-means that our articles
are accessible to a fairly wide audience. If I want to learn about a
new area, I can do so by picking up virtually any article.2
This is far different in fields whose journals are solely edited
by faculty. In philosophy, for example, it is not uncommon for a
lawyer-reader to be somewhat mystified when reading an article.
The author typically assumes his or her readership knows pre-
cisely with whom the article is arguing and over what topic. The
writer may not even bother to identify either, never mind ex-
plaining the literature as a whole.
Of course, while most articles in the faculty-edited journals
of other disciplines omit discussion of background, such journals
do publish occasional articles whose sole purpose is to review the
literature on a given topic. Conceivably, we could follow that
model. Nevertheless, the current format of instant access to
background is useful to us because of the high number of interre-
lated fields within law. "[Sicholarship directed at narrow inter-
ests will often generate interest and vlue in unexpected plac-
es."22 Also, as Tocqueville argued, lawyers in our country pos-
sess a special kind of influence;" as such we have a special re-
sponsibility to make ourselves understood.'
Further, it is all too easy to spend our time reinventing the
wheel. We all know that even pygmies see further than ordinary
o It is also a good thing that not all do.
2 The same may not be true for non-lawyers.
See Leibman and White, 39 J Legal Educ at 422 (cited in note 3).
See Alexis de Tocqueville, Phillips Bradley, ed, Henry Reeve trans, Democracy in
America 272-80 (Alfred A. Knopf, 1963). For being reminded of lawyers' special role in
this connection, I am indebted to Richard Ford.
2 Compare Linda Hirshman's suggestion that "[a]s virtuous rulers of the law schools,
law teachers have a responsibility to enable the ruled to participate in the regime." Linda
R. Hirshman, Nobody in Here But Us Chickens: Legal Education and the Virtues of the
Ruler, 45 Stan L Rev 1905, 1929 (1993) (developing and applying a virtue-based ethic). (I
am also indebted to her for bringing to mind the Tocqueville material.).
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mankind when "standing on the shoulders of giants." An insis-
tence on knowing where we have come from will make it more
likely that we and our readers will know when we are saying
something new.
Admittedly, some scholars and some faculties have profited
by ignoring this: they trust that if they occasionally err by un-
knowingly repeating prior art, this will be more than outweighed
by the increase in the number of articles they can write and
ideas they can advance. This viewpoint might prevail with me,
except for the role that acknowledging the past plays in safe-
guarding the meritocratic elements of our profession.
B. The Intellectual Property Regime of Scholarship: The Role
Played by Background Exposition and Footnotes
The intellectual property regime that governs scholarship is
probably the best-functioning regime that we currently have for
governing intellectual products. For purposes of contrast, note
the problems inherent in the most salient alternative regimes: a
property regime, a liability-rule regime,' a regime of public sub-
sidy, or a regime of advertiser support. Every regime except that
of scholarship poses intractable trade-offs between economic and
noneconomic incentive effects, administrative costs, and free
speech.
To illustrate, consider a property regime like copyright. It
provides incentives at a relatively low level of administrative
cost. But it poses the dangers that culture will be subordinated to
popularity and that intellectual-property owners will use their
exclusive rights to engage in private censorship." Thus Disney
has successfully silenced a parody of which it disapproved, the
United States Olympic Committee has used its trademark to
' The term "liability rule" is of course derived from the classic article, Guido
Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv L Rev 1089 (1972). In a liability-rule regime, intellec-
tual property owners would lack a full property-rule veto over the uses that might be
made of their property, but they would be able to obtain governmentally-set compensation
for uses to which they did not consent. Allowing a damage-only remedy is a form of
liability rule, as is a compulsory license.
' Note that even from an economic perspective, using property for purposes of
censorship is less justifiable than are most other uses of property. See, for example,
Wendy J. Gordon, Toward a Jurisprudence of Benefits: The Norms of Copyright and the
Problems of Private Censorship, 57 U Chi L Rev 1009, 1042-43 (1990) (review essay)
(arguing that in situations involving highly personalized and emotional investment, there
is often no "highest valued use" that can be determined independently of the legal alloca-
tion of entitlement starting points).
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force the Gay Olympics into changing its name, and J.D. Salinger
was able to keep out of book stores a biography that quoted from
letters he had deposited in university libraries."
A liability-rule regime such as compulsory licensing avoids
the danger of private censorship. However, such systems may
involve insuperable administrative costs that could overwhelm
incentive effects." Governmental subsidies can restore some
positive incentive for production, but they pose the danger of
public censorship. Advertiser-sponsored dissemination (as on TV
or in magazines) provides incentives and conceivably might be
structured to avoid censorship by any one particular person, but
it poses the danger of a lowest-common-denominator cultural
product that is constructed to be noncontroversial and thus fun-
damentally uninformative.
By contrast, what governs scholarship is a set of informal
rules that avoids the censorship problem without incurring great
administrative costs or sacrificing incentives. All of us can use
others' ideas, and sometimes even language, without the author's
advance permission: all we need "pay" is a citation or other reci-
tation of our debt." This system works for scholarship due to
the fortunate confluence of several factors. In particular: first, we
each "pay" by registering our debts in footnotes; second, the
schools in turn "pay" those who are most commonly cited. They
award tenure, increase salaries, and give offers at prestigious
places to oft-cited folk. Censorship is avoided both because tenure
protects the proponents of unpopular views, and because the
people who pay the money are not the only people who decide
which scholars are best. Of the various intellectual property
regimes, only the scholarship system can make a plausible (if
highly imperfect) claim to preserving both high incentives to
produce and a freedom to create virtually unimpeded by
predecessors' property claims.
' See Walt Disney Productions v Air Pirates, 581 F2d 751 (9th Cir 1978); San Fran-
cisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v United States Olympic Committee, 483 US 522 (1987);
Salinger v Random House, Inc., 811 F2d 90 (2d Cir 1987). For consideration of these and
other attempts to use intellectual property for purposes of censorship, see Wendy J.
Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural
Law of Intellectual Property, 102 Yale L J 1533, 1535-46, 1583-1606 (1993).
' See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic
Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 80 Colum L Rev 1600, 1622-24, 1632-
35 (1982). See also Gordon, 102 Yale L J at 1773-76, and sources cited therein.
' Which reminds me to thank Patricia Diak (Yale class of 1994) whose enthusiastic
research for a seminar paper on plagiarism spurred me into focusing on the value of foot-
notes as a method of intellectual property payment.
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CONCLUSION
In response to Jim Lindgren's review essay, this brief article
has presented a qualified defense of student-run journals. It has
also suggested that certain practices of those journals are crucial
to the success of the relevant intellectual property regime in pro-
moting both substantive progress and meritocracy.
P.S. This Essay was inspired by appreciation of the student
editors who have made significant contributions to my published
work, primarily Pat Cipollone, Claire Finkelstein, Susan Pilcher,
Adam Pritchard, Myron Rumeld, and Gene Scalia. I have not had
the opportunity to thank any of them in public before. 0 Thanks,
guys.
' Though on a couple of occasions I've tried to sneak the name of my editor into the
thank-you footnote, the reviews have refused. So I would like to take this opportunity also
to thank two wonderful non-student editors I've worked with: Richard Epstein and
Theresa Glover.
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